Source: Kristóf (2012) As for education, the high proportion of graduates is a constant in the cultural elite. A university or college degree seems to be a permanent standard. While the cultural elite has become more open to women during the last two decades, it has become more closed in terms of social origin.
The share of elite members with white collar fathers increased throughout the whole period. In 1988, the share of blue-collar fathers was above 50 per cent in all segments. This proportion fell dramatically after the system change: the new members clearly came from families of higher status. The cultural elite was affected less by the system change than the political elite, and the share of former Communist Party (MSZMP) members gradually decreased in the first decade of post-communism and halted subsequently. This may have been caused by the permanent presence of a distinguished 'great generation' that could be detected in the political as well as the cultural elite (Kristóf, 2012) .
During the whole period, cultural capital was the most important element of the elite status of the cultural elite. Elite universities in Budapest have been especially important in the selection of the cultural elite. In this respect, processes of homogamy and status transmittance could also be observed (Kovách 2011).
In previous studies about the cultural elite, informally influential members of the elite received special focus. I have examined comprehensively those elite members who had the greatest reputation according to other elite members. Reputation was related to age, participation in public life, and artistic activity. Artists were more reputable than scientists. The older they were and the more they published in media not related to their profession, the greater the reputation they had. The reputation of those elite members who engaged in public intellectual activity was also politically determined: leftist and rightist intellectual canons existed side by side (Kristóf 2014 (Kristóf , 2013 (Kristóf , 2011 .
The Hungarian cultural elite is deeply polarized politically and ideologically. 'Culture wars' (Kulturkampf) have been prevalent phenomena after the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. In contrast to politics, the cultural elite was not affected significantly by the regime change; most of its members 'survived' the transformation period (Szelényi, Szelényi, and Kovách 1995; Kristóf 2012) . Consequently, two parallel narratives dominated Hungarian intellectual life. According to the left-liberal view, the recruitment of the late communist period's cultural elite was primarily meritocratic, and cultural canons settled in the transition period were culturally legitimate. According to right-wing intellectuals, leftist hegemony or dominancy in culture was the product of 40 years of discretional counter-selection, and conservative, nationalistic views remained unfairly repressed by the post-communist elite.
According to our earlier studies, reputation-producing mechanisms were indeed functioning more strongly in the leftist intellectual community: most reputable personalities in the cultural elite belonged to that group (Kristóf 2014). "Left-liberals must cope with the fact that for them, 'seven lean years' are coming in cultural policy/politics" 3
CASE STUDY -THE FIELD OF THEATRE
Before I analyze the elite change in the theatre sphere, I briefly introduce the structure of the Hungarian theatrical field. Hungary basically has a state-funded, company-theatre structure, and all of the larger Hungarian cities have local theatres with a permanent local company.
Budapest is the only city with several theatres. Among the theatres, the National Theatre has symbolically privileged status. Besides this basic structure, there are some freelance actors and Partly because of the permanent company-theatre structure, the functioning of theatres is strongly dependent on state support. They are co-financed by ticket revenue, state support and company tax deductions. Purely market-based productions rarely exist in the 'high cultural'
sphere. Theatres are owned and maintained by local municipalities (in the case of a few important institutions, alongside the Ministry of Human Resources), which provide the resources for functioning. Another important actor is the National Cultural Fund (NCF) that supports productions with grants. This support is extremely important for independent companies that do not have a municipal sponsor. NCF is a state fund that is formally led by the Minister of Human Resources. However, representatives of the theatrical sphere are also involved in the grant-awarding procedure as decision-makers.
To define the elite of the field, two overlapping type of elite should be distinguished. The positional elite is composed of the leaders of the field's main institutions: theatres, professional organizations and universities. Membership criteria for the reputational elite is less objective, but professional awards are a good proxy of reputation. The reputational elite is approximated by the recipients of the highest professional awards.
5
The mechanisms of elite recruitment are twofold. The inner processes and the external social environment of the field are both crucial. To obtain the position of theatre director, professional prestige (based on cultural capital) is required. However, the owners of the theatres are local municipalities, which have the right to appoint directors (along with the Ministry of Human
Resources, normally for five years). Given this structure, the appointment of directors has never been just a matter of professional standards. It also depends on the party affiliation of the local government. Prestigious awards are also made by the state. Accordingly, the impact of political power can be clearly observed alongside the influence of the professional referee committees.
Circulation of the positional elite
The circulation of the positional elite in the theatre sphere started after the 2006 municipal elections that were won by Fidesz, Viktor Orbán's party. Power relations started to change in the sphere, triggered by political change. Since then, most of the country town theatre directors have been replaced (see Table 2 ). Society. Scandals around the selection of the jury resulted in a boycott of the festival by some theatres in 2015. In that year, Attila Vidnyánszky won four awards . In the following year, the two societies agreed to nominate members of the festival jury by parity, which made the new status quo explicit. Curiously, the Grand Prix of the latest festival went to a country town theatre (Kecskemét) that was led by a director closely attached to the Fidesz party. In the meantime, the winning play was directed by a stage diretor who was a distinguished member of the former reputational elite.
In March 2017, a public opinion poll (N=500) surveyed the reputation of some members of the Hungarian cultural elite. Among others, the two latest directors of the National Theatre were included in the survey (see Table 4 ). Both of them are emblematic figures in the theatre sphere, representing the two competing elite groups. However, there is a significant difference between Budapest and the countryside as regards elite circulation. Countryside theatres, given their monopolistic position in their towns, are generally less specialized than theatres in the capital. In the absence of a distinct artistic character, directors are easy to replace. By contrast, for the Budapest theatres hardly any applicants desired to compete against brand-shaping, prominent incumbent directors. Another difference concerns the local importance of theatres. In smaller cities, the popularity and ticket sales of local theatres are more important for local politicians than in the capital. In some cases, this consideration trumps political affiliations. For example, a 'political appointee' failed financially for two years in the city of Győr, and was then replaced by a politically neutral candidate. What are the consequences of the elite circulation on the structure of the theatre field? Positional elite change seems to have been successful. However, it is more difficult to change mechanisms that produce reputation. While the positional elite can be easily displaced, the construction of professional reputation is slow and difficult.
At the beginning of this paper, I emphasized the role of institutional cultural capital in the recruitment of the cultural elite. In the case of the theatre elite, the University of Theatre and Film Arts is a crucial hegemonic institution. Without its political control, elite recruitment cannot be controlled. The university repelled several political attacks, thus challenger elite members started to build up a counter-institution, which may be a slow but culturally accepted way of constructing their own reputational elite. (They have even deliberated starting a new graduate training program for theatre critics, which clearly shows their aspirations.) However, the cumulative advantages of the Budapest University make the outcomes of these attempts ambiguous.
In my case study, I examined how politically motivated elite circulation happened in the Hungarian theatre sphere. The same direction of change is observable in other cultural fields as well. The governing elite is attempting to rewrite cultural canons and occupy existing elite positions in the cultural field. In other cases, they have founded new cultural institutions and positions, as well as created or strengthened parallel/alternative structures alongside existing ones in the cultural field in order to elicit elite change. Changing the financial system of culture in favor of new loyal groups is also part of this process.
However, newly placed elite members do not represent any kind of cultural or ideological unity.
The criterion for their recruitment is simply that they should not be attached to the old elite.
They have to demonstrate their political loyalty to obtain their appointments, but strong ideological identification is not required. Interviews undertaken for this case study support earlier findings (Kristóf 2014) that, despite strong polarization and political division in the cultural elite, aesthetic and artistic differences cut across political preferences. Therefore, the aesthetic concepts of newly appointed directors are almost as heterogeneous as those of the earlier elite. 14 Once new cultural elite members have shown loyalty, they are not controlled directly by the political elite. Instead, they enjoy wide autonomy in managing their institutions and realizing their artistic concepts freely, whether in a dilettantish or professional way.
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Besides being political appointees, new members of the elite come from the cultural field, with some amount of accumulated cultural capital. Once in position, they usually legitimize themselves by following the norms and logic of the cultural field, which often leads to the strengthening of previous cultural structures, not their elimination. This situation can be observed both in their decisions about theatre management and awarding policies. One interviewee from the case study shed light on these mechanisms as follows:
"What happened was the following: once a nice rightist guy was appointed as theatre director, The theatre sphere is a cultural field in which politics can relatively easy interfere to bring about positional elite change. However, it cannot easily bring about substantive change. This process shows the limited efficacy of political patronage in the cultural elite. At the end of the studied period, a new status quo seems to be emerging between old and new elite groups. However, given that culture is strongly dependent on the resources of political power, the status quo is still at the mercy of political change.
